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The recent presidential election was dominated by concerns for the
economy and more particularly the continuing competitiveness of U.S.
industries. The candidates repeatedly identified areas where our regulatory
climate disadvantages local firms in their competition with foreign firms. No
industry is immune from such concerns and, given the well developed state of
globalized trading and multinational securities offerings, the subject of
securities regulation is especially suitable for close examination of how
countries, and particularly -the United States, should respond to the
international regulatory competition. The internationalization of securities
offerings and trading raises concerns beyond normalizing regulatory
approaches among sister states.
We also can and should examine the regulatory practices of other nations
to measure the worth of our own approaches, for certainly the United States
holds no monopoly on either virtue or regulatory efficiency. Moreover, there
is a need to develop coherent theories for choosing which country should
have the paramount authority to regulate as well as means to assure the
effective enforcement of that power whenever the misconduct crosses
international borders or the ill-gotten gains are in another country. These
issues were examined in a lively and productive conference held on October
24 and 25, 1991, at Duke University. The conference was made possible by
the financial support of the New York Stock Exchange and the Josiah Charles
Trent Memorial Foundation, to whom we express our great appreciation.
The conference conveners were Mr. Gary Lynch and ProfessorJames D. Cox.
Both found it tremendously rewarding to work with the authors both during
the conference and afterward during refinements to their manuscripts. The
end product stands as the best evidence of our high opinion of the overall
contribution all have made to the many facets of international regulatory
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competition as it applies to the securities laws. The articles appearing in this
symposium embody their authors' perspectives on the issues as refined
through the benefit of the rich dialogue among the conference's participants.
The balance of this foreword provides an abstract of the contributions of each
of the published articles.
The European Community ("EC") is a microcosm of the problems facing
competing regulatory bodies around the world. For example, each EC
directive must consider how to respond to the differences in regulatory
treatment of an item that occurs in more than one member state. Mr. Waide
Warner examines the regulatory policies fulfilled by applying home country
rules, host country rules or harmonized rules as these choices apply to
intereuropean financial services. In doing so, he demonstrates that overall,
the policy of mutual recognition promotes competition, but that it does so at a
nonsignificant cost to the public policy of a host country.
On January 1, 1993, the EC's Second Banking Directive becomes effective,
allowing banks domiciled in any EC member state to provide a full range of
investment services throughout the Community. This development grants
banks a significant competitive advantage over nonbank investment firms,
who must await the EC Commission's approval of the Investment Services
Directive ("ISD") to enjoy freedoms similar to bank investment firms.
Professor Norman S. Poser examines the major roadblock to the ISD's
adoption-the question of how to respond to the differences between EC
member states who have different trading systems. The article provides an
insightful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses between quote-driven and
order-driven trading systems and offers an approach for the EC Commission
to consider in its deliberations of the ISD.
The EC's proposed Takeover Directive has, as expected, produced a good
deal of controversy. A full appreciation of the sources of its controversy is
provided by David Berger's thorough analysis of the widely varying takeover
regulations in three important EC countries-the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany. The experiences of the three studied countries are most likely
to influence the ultimate content of the EC's requirements. Through his
comparative treatment of these regulatory regimes, we learn why the EC's
action in this area has been controversial, particularly if its final directive
unsettles the protective inhibiting procedures that exist in France. Of special
interest in Berger's analysis is his examination of how culture impacts the
content of regulation in each country.
Messrs. Beller, Teral, and Levine provide an insider's perspective on the
registration process for initial public offerings ("IPOs") in Japan. It is a
process in which disclosure plays a relatively minor role, being supplanted by
an extensive merit review process. With their experiences from practicing in
both Japan and the United States, the authors offer a rich comparison of the
virtues and pitfalls of registering an IPO in each country. Messrs. Beller,
Teral, and Levine examine the causes for concern regarding the lack of
transparency and predictability under Japan's merit review procedures.
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The press informs us daily about the move to markets in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the successor to the Soviet Union.
Professors Belozertsev and Markham examine the evolution of commodity
markets in the former Soviet republics from their restrained role under the
Czars and Soviet Premiers to their rapid development in today's independent
states. The authors describe the important contributions commodity markets
make in the development of an economy, particularly an economy moving
from central planning to free markets. They nevertheless detail many
regulatory deficiencies in the republics' commodity markets and propose
regulatory changes to improve their overall efficiency.
ProfessorJames Cox develops a model of competitive securities regulation
and data to support his view that U.S. securities markets are at a competitive
disadvantage to their foreign counterparts. He counsels that the time is long
overdue for the United States to liberalize its disclosure requirements and
Professor Cox suggests a series of initiatives to make U.S. markets more
competitive without sacrificing the investors' interests. More broadly,
Professor Cox puts forth a framework within which countries can consider
whether a particular disclosure requirement constitutes destructive regulatory
competition or is legitimate experimentation and expression of that country's
regulatory philosophy.
Regulatory interest in insider trading is worldwide. Messrs. Pitt and
Hardison examine the political setting within which regulation and
enforcement of insider trading occurs internationally, emphasizing the
policies of Australia, France, Germany,Japan, and Mexico. From their review,
they proffer several lessons the United States can learn from the approaches
of its sister countries, foremost of which is the ability to provide a statutory
definition of insider trading. Messrs. Pitt and Hardison also emphasize
employing organizations' obligation to adopt procedures to deter their
employees from violating local insider trading laws.
Professor Tom Hazen's article uses the United States' extensive
experience with the regulation of insider trading to critique the treatment of
insider trading by the recent EC Insider Trading Directive. Hazen laments
the failed efforts of the United States Congress to define insider trading, and
praises the ability of the EC to confront head on the definitional problems
that have posed the greatest obstacles to U.S. legislative efforts in this area.
With globalized trading increasing, difficult jurisdictional questions arise
concerning what country should proscribe market frauds. Using modern
financial theory, Professor Merritt Fox examines the varying interests
countries have in regulating insider trading when it crosses international
borders. Professor Fox disaggregates insider trading and proceeds to
examine the rationale for regulating each act and consequence of such
trading. Rather than invoking the standard approach of resolving conflicting
regulatory interests through principles of international law, Professor Fox
demonstrates that the optimal approach is one that focuses on the individual
country's jurisdiction to prescribe. An important dimension of his analysis is
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the individual country's political and economic interest to regulate the
transactions of foreign issuers.
One of the most exciting features of the U.S. securities laws' antifraud
provisions is their malleability in the hands of the courts, which frequently
extend their reach to nontraditional forms of fraud. Professor Donald
Langevoort uses the classic illustration of this occurrence, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,' to explore the connection between substantive breadth and
jurisdictional reach, focusing on international transactions. By invoking
Schoenbaum's effects test, Professor Langevoort offers a useful approach for
limiting the reach of the antifraud provisions to international transactions
without violating the overall philosophy of the U.S. securities laws. His
approach is similar to that of Professor Cox in that each author believes that
investors considering foreign investments should internalize into their
decision the relative quality of the home country's regulatory requirements.
Central to the detection and prosecution of international securities frauds
has been the Securities and Exchange Commission's negotiation of
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs") with their counterparts around the
world. These cooperative arrangements removed barriers that once
constrained the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
investigate and pursue foreign suspects whose fraudulent schemes penetrated
U.S. markets. Messrs. Michael Mann and Paul Leder and Ms. ElizabethJacobs
discuss the second shoe to drop in the development of international
enforcement mechanisms: the evolution of devices to reach the violators'
illicit profits so those profits can be returned to injured investors. Their
article discusses the current framework within which securities regulators
obtain and execute judgments against foreign defendants. The authors
suggest a model of developing mutual cooperative arrangements for the
enforcement of judgments that borrows from the experiences that preceded
today's MOUs as well as the existing international conventions, such as those
that apply to drug trafficking and money laundering, the European
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, and various mutual legal assistance treaties.
The most fertile field for the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
securities laws is the expansive use of Rule lOb-5 in private litigation.
Advance sheets are replete with cases entertaining causes of action that have
limited connections with the United States. Professor Robert W. Hillman
challenges the contemporary view that the securities acts are public laws and
hence not amenable to choice of law rules. He eschews the empty labels of
"public" and "private" law and persuasively argues that private litigation
based on the securities laws should be open for choice of law considerations.
One of the great fears of a company entering U.S. markets, particularly
through a domestic subsidiary, is the fear of liability of its officers or directors.
One mechanism to dampen somewhat the fears of costly derivative suit
1. 405 F2d 200 (2d Cir 1968), rev'd in part en banc, 405 F2d 215 (2d Cir 1968).
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litigation is the utilization of an independent investigator in such contests.
Professor Seligman shares the insights he recently gained as such an
investigator under Michigan's newly enacted "disinterested person" statute
similar to the German investigative judge. Professor Seligman's account
suggests the disinterested person device is a worthy replacement for the more
suspect special litigation committee, especially if the investigator follows the
path he has blazed.
Mr. Glenn Sarno examines the general theories and legal standards for
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident foreign subsidiary under
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of the presence in
the United States of its parent corporation. He examines the content of a
reasonableness standard in such cases as well as the availability of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as devices to avoid an unfair exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the foreign entity.
A significant consideration in deciding in which country to make a public
offering of its securities is the liability of the issuer and the offering's
participants if the offering is tainted by a misleading prospectus or offering
circular. Mr. Robert Kohn provides a penetrating comparison of the public
and private sanctioning mechanisms in the United Kingdom for public
offerings. In his comparative study, Mr. Kohn reveals the British preference
for governmental rather than private enforcement actions. The British
preference no doubt reflects the limited role private actions can play in a
society not endowed with a rich history of class actions contingency fee
arrangements.
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